Hormuz oil crossings fall 70 per cent as US-Iran talks stall

By Margaret Hale · 2026-08-17

The numbers behind a near-empty waterway

The Strait of Hormuz, the narrow corridor between Iran and Oman through which roughly one-fifth of the world's seaborne oil trade ordinarily passes, has gone almost quiet. Kpler risk and compliance data shows daily Strait of Hormuz crossings falling from roughly 45 to just 13 following the return to conflict, a 70 per cent collapse that has rattled freight markets and energy traders alike.^[1]

Reid I'Anson, writing for Kpler, said the figure was not a forecast or a model output but a straight count of vessels that actually passed through. On one day in mid-July, that count fell to single digits.

On 12 July, only 11 ships traversed the strait in a single day, the lowest daily count recorded since 14 June, according to S&P Global Commodities at Sea.^[3] Three days earlier, on 9 July, oil tanker traffic had already reached what analysts described as a near standstill, with war-risk concerns prompting vessels to pause voyages mid-passage.^[4]

A diplomatic deadlock with four conditions

A 60-day ceasefire signed on 17 June briefly promised a reopening of the strait. Subsequent US airstrikes and Iranian reprisals unravelled that arrangement, and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps made its position explicit: the waterway would stay closed until a set of demands was satisfied.^[5]

Mohsen Rezaei, adviser to Iran's Supreme Leader, said the strait would not reopen until the U.S. ends the war and blockade, releases Iran's frozen assets, and agrees to a region-wide ceasefire, including in Lebanon and Gaza.^[5] Three of those four demands were already enumerated in the June memorandum of understanding. None has been met.

Oman-brokered talks between Washington and Tehran have produced no agreement. The US has not lifted its naval presence from Iranian port approaches; Iran has not moderated its conditions.

LNG goes dark

No LNG carrier has transited the Strait of Hormuz since 11 July, with the last vessel to pass through being the Adnoc-operated Al Hamra.^[2] Gas shipments that would ordinarily exit the Gulf via the strait have no straightforward alternative routing: unlike crude oil, which can move through overland pipelines and piped to Red Sea terminals, liquefied gas requires dedicated cryogenic infrastructure that does not exist at scale along any other corridor.

The Al Hamra's passage on 11 July now stands as an accidental marker. What followed was not a gradual decline but an abrupt halt, the product of renewed strikes rather than a negotiated suspension. Vessels anchored in the Gulf or idling off Oman's coast are waiting not for weather or port berths but for a geopolitical outcome that nobody can reliably time.

Workarounds and their limits

Overland pipeline capacity, particularly through Iraq and Turkey, has been pressed harder than at any point in recent years. Ship-to-ship crude transfers off Oman's coast have increased, allowing some cargoes to bypass the narrowest section of the strait by transiting Iranian coastal waters. Freight costs and war-risk insurance premiums have risen sharply on both alternatives.

These workarounds carry inherent limits. Overland pipelines were not designed to absorb a wholesale displacement of maritime volume, and their throughput capacity is finite. Ship-to-ship transfers add days to voyage times, push up demurrage costs for charterers, and remain dependent on continued anchorage availability off the Omani coast.

Kpler data shows that a disproportionate share of remaining crossings is now using the Iranian coastal route rather than the main channel, reflecting both navigational caution and the changed risk calculus for vessels transiting waters where US and Iranian naval assets remain in close proximity.^[1]

Australian exposure at the bowser

For Australians, the consequences of a prolonged blockade are likely to arrive first at the petrol station. Analysts have estimated that if Persian Gulf supply remains constrained through the end of the year, Australian fuel prices could rise by up to four US cents per litre.^[4] That figure compounds against a global crude price that has already absorbed the shock of restricted Hormuz traffic, and against freight and insurance costs that have risen for every cargo now taking a longer or more uncertain route to market.

Australia does not directly import Iranian crude, but it is not insulated from the pricing dynamics of a market that does. Disruption to Gulf LNG exports carries its own downstream risk for Australian energy users, given the interconnection between global gas markets and domestic pricing signals. The full exposure depends on how long the current standoff persists.

Iran's four conditions remain formally on the table and formally unmet. Washington has offered no public signal that it is prepared to meet them, and the Oman channel has so far been unable to bridge the gap. Kpler's crossing count of 13 ships per day speaks precisely to the distance between the current diplomatic position and an open sea lane.

Margaret Hale

Margaret Hale writes about politics, policy and the culture of business. She is drawn to the people behind decisions and to the moments when a political story turns out to be a human one.